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A distinction has been drawn between general custom, custom so widespread as to be
judicially noted, and usage, custom limited to a class or locality. Hicks Co. v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 174 Ark. 587, 296 S.W. 46 (1927); Anglo-Hellenic S.S. Co. v. Dreyfous &
Co., io8 L.T. 36 (193); Salt, the Local Ambit of Custom, Cambridge Legal Essays
(1926), 279. A general custom binds even those who are unaware of it. Howard v.
Walker, 92 Tenn. 452, 21 S.W. 897 (1893); Spokane Valley State Bank v. Lutes, 133
Wash. 66, 233 Pac. 308 (1925). But unless the existence of a usage is brought to the
attention of the parties they are not bound by it. Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy,
264 U.S. 16o (1924); American Savings Bank and Trust Co. v. Dennis, 90 Wash. 547,
156 Pac. 550 (igi6). What is custom and what merely usage is often a difficult question leading to a difference of opinion. Lowell Co-Op Bank v. Sheridan,284 Mass. 594,
App. 372 (1933). In the instant
188 N.E. 636 (i934); cf. Johannsen v. Evans, 271 Ill.
case a fair interpretation indicates that the practice was limited to a particular locality. Insofar as it was a local custom and the maker had no knowledge of it, the court
properly held that the statutory requirement of presentation within a reasonable
time was not affected by the presence of custom. Since the payee secured the advantage of lower clearing charges, it does not seem unfair to place on him the risks incident to roundabout collection methods. See 31 Yale L. J. i89 (1921).

Constitutional Law-Billboard Regulation-Exercise of Police Power for Aesthetic Purposes.-[Massachusetts].-The Department of Public Works of Massachusetts was empowered by constitutional amendment and statute to "regulate and
restrict" the use of billboards. Mass. Const. Amend. art. 5o; Mass. Gen. Laws (1921), c.
93, § 29-33. The regulations prohibited billboards within certain distances of streets
or highways, within three hundred feet of any park and wherever the commissioners
believed they would mar scenic beauty. Plaintiffs, billboard owners, contended that
these regulations deprived them of the use of their property without due process of
law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States. Held, that the regulation was a valid exercise of the state police power. The
highway regulations were justified on the traditional ground that billboards create a
driving hazard by attracting the attention of passing motorists, and are a nuisance
since they force unwelcome advertising messages before the eyes of travellers. The
'"park" and "scenic beauty" regulations, however, were sustained on the ground that
aesthetic considerations alone will justify an exercise of the police power. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works, 193 N.E. 799 (Mass. 1935).
The case marks the climax of a trend toward police power regulation-for aesthetic
ends, the court suggesting a new theory to justify such legislation. It should be noted,
however, that, because of the amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution, the due
process clause of the federal Constitution only was involved. This fact may have influenced the court to be more liberal than if the billboard legislation in question had
been attacked as violating both state and federal due process clauses. The right to
own and use property, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution, can be denied or restricted by a state only when the interference is justified
as a valid exercise of police power. Freund, Police Power (1904), 3. The orthodox rule
is that the police power of a state is limited to legislation affecting the public health,
safety, morals and general welfare. Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1916)

RECENT CASES
(billboard restriction held constitutional); cf. Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 79
N.E. 745 (1907) (building height restriction valid because of light, air, and fire detriments to the public); Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 597, 127 N.E. 525 (1920)
(billboards endanger motorists by distracting driver's attention); Cochran v. Preston,
io8 Md. 220, 70 At. 113 (198o) (tall buildings are fire hazards); St. Louis Gunning
Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (9ii) (billboards
hide criminals and prostitutes and function as privies and fire hazards). Traditionally it could not be exercised for purposes which the courts felt were purely
aesthetic. CurranBill Posting Co. v. Denver, 47 Colo. 221, 107 Pac. 261 (gio) (billboards in city have not sufficient relation to health and welfare of the public to justify
restriction); Williston v. Cooke, 54 Colo. 320, 130 Pac. 828 (1913) (business restrictions
in residential districts are purely for aesthetic ends); Haller Sign Works v. Physical
Culture Training School, 249 Ill. 436, 94 N.E. 920 (igii) (billboard restriction within
50o feet of a public park); People v. City of Chicago, 261 Ill. 16, 1O3 N.E. 609 (1913)
(ordinance restricting retail stores from residential districts invalid); State Bank and
Trust Co. v. Village of Wilmette, 193 N.E. 131 (Ill.
1934) (zoning business restriction
invalid because based solely on aesthetic considerations); City of Passaicv. Paterson
Bill Posting Co., 72 N. J.L. 285, 62 At. 267 (T9o5) (billboards ten feet back of building
line); Spann v. City of Dallas, 1ii Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513 (1921) (business building
restriction is purely for aesthetic purposes); Piper v. Ekern, 18o Wis. 586, 194 N.W.
159 (1923) (building height cannot be restricted because only aesthetic ends); Burdick,
Law of the American Constitution (1922), 567; 3 Conn. L. Rev. 135 (1918); ig Mich.

L.

Rev. 191 (192o).

Courts in recent years, however, have tended to give greater weight to aesthetic
considerations in justifying various types of police regulations. Chandler, The Attitude of Law toward Beauty, 8 A. B. A. J. 470 (1922). The building restriction and
zoning ordinance cases evidence this change. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1920); Windsor v.Whitney, 95 Conn. 357, 111 At. 354 (1920) (beauty
and wholesomeness of building line regulation considered); State v.Kievrnan, 116 Conn.
458, 165 At. 6oi (1933) (considered aesthetic effect of a junk yard in residential section); Ware v.City of Wichita, 113 Kans. 153, 214 Pac. 9g (1923) (court practically
rested case on aesthetic considerations though incidentally mentioned some relation
to health and safety); State ex rel. Civello v.New Orleans,154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923)
(health and welfare supplemented by aesthetic reasons). The courts have been particularly wrilling to consider the aesthetic effects of billboards in allowing their regulation. St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v.St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919); see State ex
rel. Civello v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923) (billboard cases might well
have rested solely on aesthetic considerations); Perlmutter v.Greene, 259 N.Y. 327,
182 N.E. 5 (1932). See 46 Harv. L. Rev. 157 (1932); Baker, Municipal Aesthetics and
the Law, 20 Ill. L. Rev. 546 (1926).
The changing attitude of the courts toward beauty is reflected in the eminent
domain cases where aesthetic considerations are given much weight in justifying condemnation proceedings. See Shoemaker v.U.S., 147 U.S. 282 (1892) (land may be
taken for parks if owner is compensated); see Attorney General v.Williams, 174 Mass.
476, 480, 55 N.E. 77, 78 (1899) (dictum to effect that the height of buildings around
parks can be limited); State ex rel. Twin City Building and Investment Co. . Houghton,
149 Minn.i, 176 N.W. 159 (1920) ("It is time that courts recognized the aesthetic as a
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factor in life"); In re New York, 57 App. Div. i66, 68 N. Y. S. 196 (igol) (the center
of a street for planting trees was taken by eminent domain proceedings); Nichols,
Power of Eminent Domain (1917), 161. Although, in the eminent domain cases the
owners are compensated, the courts' attitude toward beauty in them has had a decided influence in "police power" cases. Cf. State ex rel. Twin City Building and Investment Co. v. Houghton, 149 Minn. 1,176 N.W. 159 (1920) (eminent domain zoning
case); and State ex rel. Beery v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146, 204 N.W. 569 (1925) (similar
ordinance sustained under police power). The court in the principal case, instead of
rationalizing its decision by "health and safety" arguments, declared unequivocally
that regulation for aesthetic ends is a valid exercise of police power.
The courts in refusing to sustain police power regulation in previous cases have
construed "aesthetic" to mean "an appreciation of the beautiful." On this interpretation they have denied an interference with private property rights when the purpose
was solely to satisfy the desire of the public to live in a more beautiful or attractive
environment. The court in the principal case, however, placed an economic value on
beauty, considering it as an asset of the state enuring to the benefit of the public.
Thus the scenic beauty of the state in attracting tourists results in great economic
benefit to the state. Similarly, attractive residential districts greatly increase the
actual value of the property of the people in that area. This concept makes restriction for aesthetic purposes analogous to police power control in other instances. It
has been frequently held that a private owner cannot be allowed to dissipate the
natural resources of the state in order to gain a slight benefit to himself. Ohio Oil v.
Indiana,177 U.S. 190 (19oo) (owner wasting large quantities of gas in order to produce
a small amount of oil); see Lindsley v. Natural CarbonicGas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911);
Wall, Attorney General of the State of Wyoming v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300
(1920) (state can prevent private owner from burning gas wastefully purely for purpose of producing carbon). And it has been held that the use of private property can
be restricted when such use results in great economic loss to the general public. Miller
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (state prevented growth of red cedars which injured
surrounding orchards). Thus the slight economic benefit to owners of billboards derived by placing them within certain distances of parks and in other places of scenic
beauty is overwhelmingly offset by the great injury that Would result to the general
public by this destruction of the community economic asset of beauty.

Constitutional Law-Exclusion of Negroes from Primaries-State Action and the
Fourteenth Amendment-[U.S.-The respondent county clerk refused the petitioner,
a negro, a Democratic primary election ballot, because of a resolution of the state
Democratic convention excluding negroes from membership in the party. Held, the
refusal did not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution, since the clerk was acting for a voluntary association and not for an agency of
the state. Grovey v. Townsend, 55 Sup. Ct. 622 (r935).
Certain Southern states have made persistent efforts to disfranchise the negro by
legal means. Ratliff v. Beale, 74 Miss. 247, 266, 20 So. 865 (x896). See reported aside
by Justice Holmes indicating that he was well aware of disfranchisement by nonlegal means. 41 Yale L.J. 1212, 1221 (1932). See also Rose, Negro Suffrage: The
Constitutional Point of View, I Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 17, 25 et seq. (19o6). Qualifications

